Núm. 52 (2020)
Artículos

La calidad de las instituciones, su impacto en la relación entre corrupción y crecimiento económico: una revisión teórica

Jesús Alfredo Mendoza Camacho
universidad autónoma de occidente
Biografía
Carlos López Portillo Tostado
Universidad Autónoma de Occidente
Biografía
Publicado enero 31, 2020
Palabras clave
  • corrupción,
  • calidad institucional,
  • crecimiento económico,
  • responsabilidad política

Resumen

Este trabajo tiene como propósito reflexionar sobre la corrupción y su relación con el crecimiento económico, así mismo determinar qué papel juega la calidad de las instituciones gubernamentales en esta relación. El argumento central es que estas tienen un papel significativo en el tratamiento de esta problemática. Su debilidad para establecer e imponer responsabilidades efectivas a los líderes políticos y servidores públicos es un factor con efectos negativos para su control. Igualmente, se expone la realidad del contexto que existe en México y Sinaloa respecto al tema en estudio razonando de qué forma se pueden mitigar sus efectos y con ello, incidir en el crecimiento económico. Como limitantes, la existencia de comportamientos individuales que - por darse en forma clandestina- resultan difíciles de estudiarse dada su naturaleza generalmente ilegal.

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