Vol. 2 (2009): núm. especial, vol. 2
Artículos

Cultura, acción colectiva y cambio institucional

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  • Gonzalo Castañeda Ramos
Gonzalo Castañeda Ramos
El Colegio de México
Biografía
DOI: https://doi.org/10.24275/ETYPUAM/NE/E022009/Castaneda
Publicado noviembre 1, 2009
Palabras clave
  • acción colectiva,
  • reformas institucionales,
  • cultura,
  • crecimiento econó- mico y trampas de pobreza
Aviso de derechos de autor/a

Resumen

Este artículo presenta una teoría que analiza la propagación de variantes culturales que inducen la cohesión al interior de la sociedad civil y, por ende, fortalecen la capacidad de un país para resolver problemas de acción colectiva. El modelo combina elementos de la teoría de juegos evolutivos con un concepto de solución para comportamientos estratégicos en donde los actores toman decisiones secuenciales en un contexto de racionalidad acotada. Con este enfoque es posible explicar la coevolución de los valores culturales contemporáneos con variables económicas y políticas, así como la importancia del legado histórico en el establecimiento de las trayectorias de desarrollo de cada país. Asimismo, se argumenta que los planteamientos teóricos en economía requieren incorporar argumentos culturales para lograr una mejor comprensión de las inercias institucionales y las trampas de pobreza.
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Citas

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