No. 44 (2016)
Artículos
Coordinación de la política monetaria entre dos bancos centrales: un análisis de teoría de juegos
Abstract
En este trabajo se analizan las condiciones bajo las cuales un país pequeño optaría por seguir un juego tipo Nash o uno de tipo Stackelberg. Para ello, se plantea un modelo de dos economías nacionales, con perturbaciones de oferta y demanda, en el cual el banco central de cada país tiene la tasa de interés como instrumento de política. Se muestra que, ante perturbaciones de la oferta, para el país pequeño es preferible la solución de Stackelberg, mientras que, si las perturbaciones son de la demanda, la solución preferible es la de Nash. Así, el punto clave sería determinar si las perturbaciones están induciendo o no un dilema en la función objetivo del banco central.References
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