Núm. 52 (2020)
Artículos

Unions and Entry to Traditional and Network Industries

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Profit differential exercise in Excel for Tables 3 and 4 (English)
  • Luciano Fanti,
  • Domenico Buccella
Luciano Fanti
University of Pisa
Biografía
Domenico Buccella
Kozminski University in Warsaw, Poland
Biografía
Publicado enero 31, 2020

Derechos de autor 2020 Economía teoría y práctica

Creative Commons License
Esta obra está bajo licencia internacional Creative Commons Reconocimiento-CompartirIgual 4.0.

Resumen

The paper analyses the effects of unionisation of the labour market under the Right-to-Manage (RTM), and Sequential Efficient Bargaining (SEB) institutions, on the entry of a firm, then comparing traditional and network industries. The findings show that under RTM unions always play a pro-competitive role, while under EB they may become a barrier to entry – under the form of the payment of a fee to obtain a monopoly grant by an authority - in network industries with intense network effects. These results shed light on the importance of the presence, on the one hand, of unions and different bargaining agendas  and on other hand of network goods on the shape of industrial competition, with the evident anti-trust and competition policies implications.

PDF (English) HTML XML (English)
Profit differential exercise in Excel for Tables 3 and 4 (English)

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